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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE transactions on industrial informatics >An Investigation on Feasibility and Security for Cyberattacks on Generator Synchronization Process
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An Investigation on Feasibility and Security for Cyberattacks on Generator Synchronization Process

机译：关于发电机同步过程的网络攻击的可行性和安全性调查

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摘要

Electric power supply is crucial for the effective operation of many sectors such as manufacturing, health care, etc. Further, electrification of the transportation network including metro-rail systems and personal electric vehicles necessitates capacity expansion of power distribution system (PDS). Capacity expansion in PDSs is seeing a clear paradigm shift from component upgrades to the incorporation of distributed energy resources. Though renewable energy sources are attractive from the sustainability aspect, conventional generators are also essential for many applications such as maintaining the grid stability. In this article, for the first time, we report a new type of attack on the generators; attacks on the synchronization process, targeting the availability of generators. The threat model considered in this article is similar to the popular real-world attacks, such as "Stuxnet worm" or programmable logic controller root-kit attacks such as "Harvey," however, the reported attack goal is novel. We propose a defense mechanism that can be decoupled from the network data and is named as physical layer security (PLS). We present theoretical analysis, simulation results, and experimental validation for the reported attack. We also propose an alternative implementation named as Level 0-1 security for cases where PLS may not be practical. The proposed defense is generic and can be extended to many other applications/attack vectors.
机译：电力供应对于许多部门的有效运行至关重要，例如制造，医疗保健等。此外，包括地铁系统和个人电动车辆在内的运输网络的电气化需要配电系统（PDS）的容量扩展。 PDS中的容量扩展是从组件升级到分布式能源资源的融合来看明确的范式转变。虽然可再生能源从可持续发展方面具有吸引力，但传统的发电机对许多应用来说也是必不可少的，例如维持网格稳定性。在本文中，我们首次报告了对发电机的新型攻击;攻击同步过程，针对生成器的可用性。本文中考虑的威胁模型类似于流行的真实攻击，例如“Stuxnet Worm”或可编程逻辑控制器根套件，如“Harvey”，但报告的攻击目标是新颖的。我们提出了一种可以从网络数据解耦的辩护机制，并被命名为物理层安全性（PLS）。我们呈现了据报道的攻击的理论分析，仿真结果和实验验证。我们还提出了一个名为0-1级别的替代实施，因为PLS可能不实用的情况。建议的防御是通用的，可以扩展到许多其他应用程序/攻击向量。

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