Optimal pricing model of car-sharing: market pricing or platform pricing

Liang Ling; Tian Lin; Xie Jiaping; Xu Jianhong; Zhang Weisi

摘要

Purpose The car-sharing market has entered the mature stage, and consumers' demand shows a diversified increasing trend. This paper considers two modes of operation and two pricing strategies, which are business-to-consumer and consumer-to-consumer modes, market pricing and platform pricing. Under these conditions, the platform's revenue-sharing ratio will be different. The purpose of this paper is to explore this research question, and seeks an optimal pricing mechanism that can achieve a win-win situation between platform and automobile manufacturer in the two market modes. Design/methodology/approach The authors design different profit functions for platform under the two contexts. Of course, the platform's function is constrained to the manufacturer's function. By introducing a revenue-sharing contract a Stackelberg game model dominated by the platform is established and the equilibrium solutions under the two pricing models are derived. Findings The study found that even if only market pricing is executed, the scale of the car-sharing market will continue to expand. As the car-sharing market becomes more saturated, platform pricing is better for the automobile manufacturer; in most cases, the platform prefers platform pricing, but when the number of private cars is relatively small, if the cost of car operation and maintenance for the automobile manufacturer is lower or the revenue-sharing ratio of private cars is high, then market pricing will be more favorable to the platform. Practical implications With the cross-border integration of car service platforms and the automobile manufacturing industry, the key to achieving win-win cooperation and sustainable development in the car-sharing market will converge on the question of how to design a suitable pricing mechanism and revenue-sharing method. Originality/value Authors have determined how a car-sharing platform achieves a win-win order pricing strategy with the manufacturer and private car owners, respectively. And authors combined the supply chain revenue-sharing contract with the car-sharing market to explore the application of the revenue-sharing contract in the sharing economy.

机译：目的，汽车分享市场已进入成熟阶段，消费者的需求表明了多元化的增加趋势。本文考虑了两种运作方式和两种定价策略，这些策略是企业对消费者和消费者的消费方式，市场定价和平台定价。在这些条件下，平台的收入共享比率将不同。本文的目的是探讨这一研究问题，并寻求最佳定价机制，可以在两个市场模式下实现平台和汽车制造商之间的双赢局势。设计/方法/方法作者在两个语境下为平台设计不同的利润功能。当然，平台的函数被限制为制造商的功能。通过介绍收入共享合同，建立了由平台主导的Stackelberg游戏模型，衍生出两种定价模型下的平衡解决方案。调查结果研究发现，即使仅执行市场定价，即使仅执行市场定价，汽车共享市场的规模将继续扩大。随着汽车共享市场变得更加饱和，平台定价更适合汽车制造商;在大多数情况下，平台更喜欢平台定价，但是当私家车的数量相对较小时，如果汽车制造商的汽车运行和维护的成本较低或私家车的收入共用比率高，那么市场定价将更有利于平台。与汽车服务平台的跨境整合的实际意义和汽车制造业的关键，在汽车分享市场中实现双赢合作和可持续发展将融合如何设计合适定价机制和收入的问题-sharing方法。原创性/价值作者已经确定了汽车共享平台如何分别与制造商和私人车主的双赢定价策略。作者和作者将供应链收入共享合同与汽车分享市场联系起来探讨收入分享合同在共享经济中的应用。

Optimal pricing model of car-sharing: market pricing or platform pricing

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