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Patent pool formation: Timing matters

机译：专利池的形成：时间问题

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摘要

This paper addresses the problem of non-cooperative patent pool formation by owners of patents related to a standard. We develop a model in which competing manufacturers must license several patents to produce standard-compliant goods. Separate licensing creates a double-marginalization problem. Moreover manufacturers must sink a fixed cost to enter the product market, and thus face a hold-up problem if licensing takes place after their entry. In this setting, the formation of a pool fails when it takes place after entry. Instead, we show that allowing patent owners to commit ex ante on joining a pool is an effective way to trigger the emergence of a stable pool solving both the double-marginalization and hold-up problems. Therefore, patent owners should be encouraged to coordinate their licensing policies on a voluntary basis at early stages in the standard-setting process.
机译：本文解决了与标准相关的专利所有人非合作形成专利池的问题。我们开发了一个模型，在该模型中，竞争厂商必须许可数项专利才能生产符合标准的商品。单独的许可产生了双重边缘化问题。此外，制造商必须付出固定的成本才能进入产品市场，因此，如果在其进入后签发许可，就会面临停滞问题。在此设置中，池在进入后发生时将失败。相反，我们表明，允许专利所有人事前承诺加入专利池是触发稳定池解决双重边际化和保留问题的有效方法。因此，应鼓励专利所有者在标准制定过程的早期阶段自愿协调其许可政策。

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