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Efficiency gains from using a market approach to spectrum management

机译：使用市场方法进行频谱管理可提高效率

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摘要

This paper is concerned with the merits of employing market forces to address the issues of wireless spectrum congestion and the allocation of spectrum between firms seeking licensed and unlicensed spectrum rights. We show that when unlicensed spectrum is assigned to all competing users during periods of excess demand an inefficient outcome related to the "Tragedy of the Commons" is likely to result. This inefficiency can be substantially reduced when the assignment of users to unlicensed spectrum is based on the bandwidth and latency tolerance needs of the competing users. Further efficiency gains can also occur when users are required to bid to have their "unlicensed spectrum" needs met in the presence of congestion. The paper also examines the merits of creating an auction based market in which firms providing spectrum based services to users bid to have their "spectrum regime" needs satisfied. The objective of this approach is to reduce the incentive that service operators have to misstate their expressed value for a given license regime. The efficiency of this approach is based in large part on the auction mechanism's ability to solve a "collective action problem" in which firms desiring unlicensed spectrum have an incentive to "free-ride" on the bidding behavior of other unlicensed firms. Together our results open up the possibility that a wide variety of spectrum policy issues may be efficiently solved using a market-based approach. They further suggest that there may be a "hybrid" regime that combines the best features of the license and unlicensed regimes and, thus, lead to a more efficient use of spectrum at any moment in time.
机译：本文关注的是利用市场力量来解决无线频谱拥塞问题以及寻求许可和非许可频谱权利的公司之间的频谱分配问题。我们表明，在需求过剩期间将无执照频谱分配给所有竞争用户时，可能会导致与“公地悲剧”相关的无效结果。当根据竞争用户的带宽和等待时间容忍需求将用户分配给未许可频谱时，可以大大降低这种效率低下的情况。当在拥塞的情况下要求用户竞价满足其“非授权频谱”需求时，也可能会进一步提高效率。本文还探讨了创建拍卖市场的优点，在该市场中，向用户提供基于频谱的服务的公司竞标满足其“频谱制度”的需求。这种方法的目的是减少服务运营商必须针对给定的许可制度错误陈述其表述价值的动机。这种方法的效率在很大程度上取决于拍卖机制解决“集体行动问题”的能力，在这种情况下，希望获得无执照频谱的公司有动力“搭便车”其他无执照公司的竞标行为。我们的研究结果共同开辟了使用基于市场的方法可以有效解决各种频谱政策问题的可能性。他们进一步建议，可能存在一种“混合”制度，将许可和未许可制度的最佳特征结合在一起，从而在任何时候都可以更有效地利用频谱。

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  • 来源
    《Information economics and policy》 |2010年第1期|73-90|共18页
  • 作者

    Mark M. Bykowsky; Mark Olson; William W. Sharkey;

  • 作者单位

    Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street S.W., Washington, DC 20554, USA;

    Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, 4400 University Drive, MSN 1B2, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA;

    Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street S.W., Washington, DC 20554, USA;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    congestion; unlicensed spectrum; auctions;

    机译：拥塞;未经许可的频谱;拍卖会;

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