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Expressive Actions

机译：表达动作

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摘要

Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, if one subscribes to the Davidsonian standard model of action explanation. So far, philosophers have had three different reactions to this challenge. Rationalists insist that such actions can be rationalized by re-interpreting them. Arationalists insist that there simply is no reasoning process moving agents in emotional states to act. A third reaction questions the intentionality of such actions altogether. All three reactions, however, share the assumption underlying the standard account: if an agent is thought to act for a reason - and hence acts intentionally -he must entertain a desire and some means-end belief reflecting his reasoning process about how to attain what he desires by acting. In this paper, I try to show that this reflective reasoning mechanism is only one way to rationalize an action. Another way is by tracing an action to an unreflective valuing stance respresenting reasons the agent has from his point of view. Emotions are attitudes that help to grasp reasons the agent has. Since emotions come with a strong motivational potential they move the agent to act expressively. But the agent typically allows himself to do so, thereby monitoring the way in which he does it. To the extent that the agent unreflectively acts on a motive that is itself representative of his point of view, his expressive actions can be regarded as rationalizable.
机译：表达情感的动作（例如，在悲伤中爱抚已故朋友的衣服，或出于嫉妒而撕开照片）给动作理论家带来了臭名昭著的挑战。人们认为它们是故意的，因为它们在某种意义上处于代理的控制之下。但是，它们之所以被认为是有原因的，是因为不能从代理人的角度用有利于他们的考虑因素来解释它们。至少如果人们赞同戴维森标准的动作解释标准模型，情况似乎就是这样。迄今为止，哲学家对这一挑战有三种不同的反应。理性主义者坚持认为，可以通过重新解释这些行为来使其合理化。理智主义者坚持认为，根本没有推理过程可以使处于情感状态的主体采取行动。第三个反应完全质疑了这种行动的意图。但是，这三个反应都基于标准帐户的假设：如果一个代理被认为是出于某种原因行事-因此有意行事-他必须表现出一种愿望和某种手段端到的信念，反映出他关于如何实现目标的推理过程他渴望通过演戏。在本文中，我试图证明这种反思性推理机制只是使行为合理化的一种方法。另一种方法是通过将行为追溯到一种非反思性的评价立场，这种立场代表了代理人从其观点来看的原因。情绪是有助于掌握代理人理由的态度。由于情绪具有强烈的动机潜能，因此它们会促使主体表现出表现力。但是代理通常会允许自己这样做，从而监控他的执行方式。在某种程度上，代理人不加反省地根据本身代表其观点的动机行事，他的表达行为可以被认为是合理的。

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  • 来源
    《Inquiry》 |2009年第3期|272-292|共21页
  • 作者

    MONIKA BETZLER;

  • 作者单位

    Institut fuer Philosophie, Universitaet Bern, Laenggassstr. 49 A, 3012 Bern, Switzerland;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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