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首页> 外文期刊>International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics >Public interest versus interest groups: a political economy analysis of allowance allocation under the EU emissions trading scheme
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Public interest versus interest groups: a political economy analysis of allowance allocation under the EU emissions trading scheme

机译:公众利益与利益集团:欧盟排放交易计划下配额分配的政治经济学分析

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摘要

In a theoretical analysis, we use a common agency model to show that lobbying by energy-intensive sectors covered under an emissions trading scheme (ETS) shifts the regulatory burden of an economy-wide emission constraint to sectors outside the ETS. The emission tax on the latter becomes inefficiently high such that lobbying does not only induce burden shifting but also efficiency losses. A complementary empirical analysis for a cross section of German firms under the EU emissions trading scheme supports our theoretical result on the role of lobbying on allowance allocation.
机译:在理论分析中,我们使用共同代理模型来表明,排放交易计划(ETS)涵盖的能源密集型行业的游说行为将整个经济范围内排放约束的监管负担转移到了ETS以外的行业。后者的排放税效率低下,致使游说不仅导致负担转移,而且导致效率损失。对根据欧盟排放交易计划对德国公司的各个部门进行的经验分析的补充,支持了我们关于游说配额分配的作用的理论结果。

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