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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers
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Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers

机译：企业的主动性和追溯性与黑客的信息共享

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摘要

One firm defends proactively or retroactively against a first hacker, and thereafter against a second hacker, in four four-period games. The hackers share information for financial gain, mutual advantage, and reputation. The first hacker's attack and information sharing are strategic substitutes. When the firm is proactive in period 1, the first hacker's information sharing decreases as the second hacker's attack cost increases. The deterring effort in eight corner solutions is proportional to the deterred player's valuation and inverse proportional to the deterred player's unit effort cost. When the first hacker exerts higher effort and shares more information, lower defense by the firm is sufficient to deter the second hacker. When the firm is deterred by the first hacker, the first hacker attacks less and shares more information than in the interior solution. For the first hacker and the firm, both players commonly prefer the disadvantaged player to move first. The exception is that the firm prefers to deter the first disadvantaged hacker when the two hackers benefit substantially from information sharing, reputation gain, or the second player is advantaged. The results contrast with the literature where the advantaged player commonly prefers to move first, with conflicting sequence preferences.
机译：在四场四期游戏中，一家公司主动或追溯地针对第一位黑客，然后针对第二位黑客。黑客共享信息以获取经济利益，共同利益和声誉。第一个黑客的攻击和信息共享是战略替代。当公司在第1阶段积极主动时，随着第二个黑客的攻击成本增加，第一个黑客的信息共享会减少。八个边角解决方案中的阻止力量与阻止玩家的估值成正比，与阻止玩家的单位努力成本成反比。当第一个黑客做出更大的努力并共享更多信息时，公司较低的防御能力足以阻止第二个黑客。当公司被第一位黑客吓倒时，与内部解决方案相比，第一位黑客攻击更少，共享更多信息。对于第一个黑客和公司，这两个玩家通常更喜欢弱势玩家先行。唯一的例外是，当两个黑客从信息共享，声誉提升中获得实质性收益，或者第二个参与者受益时，公司更愿意阻止第一个处于不利地位的黑客。结果与文献相反，在文献中，有优势的玩家通常更喜欢先发，顺序偏好相互冲突。

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