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Experimental Gaming Comparison of Resource Allocation Rules in Case of Transferable Utilities

机译：可转让公用事业情况下资源分配规则的实验游戏比较

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The present paper discusses the comparative analysis results of resource allocation rules using experiments in the form of business games. The comparative analysis involves five rules. The resource allocation mechanism that gives the efficient solution of the problem without transferable utility, implementing it as dominant strategy equilibrium in the agents game, so called Uniform rule. The mechanism with balanced payments introduced earlier by authors using the Groves Ledyard rule that gives the efficient solution of the problem as a Nash equilibrium in the agents game, as well as its modification reducing the dimension of the action space of the agents. The mechanism from the class of proportional allocation mechanisms, where, the efficient resource allocation also rep-resents a Nash equilibrium, but the payments are unbalanced. Last mechanism in the comparative analysis was originally developed as a distributed optimization algorithm.
机译：本文以商业游戏的形式，通过实验讨论了资源分配规则的比较分析结果。比较分析涉及五个规则。资源分配机制可以在没有可转移效用的情况下有效解决问题，并将其实现为主体博弈中的主导策略均衡，即统一规则。作者先前使用格罗夫斯·莱德亚德（Groves Ledyard）规则引入了平衡付款的机制，该机制有效地解决了代理博弈中的纳什均衡问题，并且对其进行了修改，从而缩小了代理的行动空间。从比例分配机制这一类的机制来看，有效的资源分配也代表了纳什均衡，但是支付是不均衡的。比较分析中的最后一种机制最初是作为分布式优化算法开发的。

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