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Information Sharing Among Cyber Hackers in Successive Attacks

机译:连续攻击中网络黑客之间的信息共享

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摘要

Supplementing the literature on information sharing between firms, the paper seeks to understand information sharing between hackers and how firms defend against increasingly sophisticated hackers. Each hacker seeks financial gain, mutually beneficial information exchange, and reputation gain. The two hackers' attack and the firm's defense are inverse U shaped in each other. A hacker shifts from attack to information sharing when attack is costly or the firm's defense is cheap. The first hacker's information sharing increases as both hackers focus increasingly on reputation gain. The two hackers largely increase their information sharing, with two exceptions. The second hacker's attack is deterred by the first hacker's reputation gain. The firm's defense against the second hacker increases in the second hacker's unit cost, decreases in the second hacker's information sharing effectiveness and utilization of joint sharing, and also decreases in both hackers' reputation gain. Policy and managerial implications are provided.
机译:作为企业间信息共享文献的补充,本文旨在了解黑客之间的信息共享以及企业如何防御日益复杂的黑客。每个黑客都在寻求经济利益,互惠互利的信息交换和声誉收益。两名黑客的攻击和公司的防御相互呈U字形。当攻击成本很高或公司的防御成本很低时,黑客将从攻击转移到信息共享。随着这两个黑客越来越关注声誉的获得,第一个黑客的信息共享也会增加。除了两个例外,这两个黑客大大增加了他们的信息共享。第二位黑客的攻击受到第一位黑客的声誉提升的阻止。公司对第二位黑客的防御增加了第二位黑客的单位成本,降低了第二位黑客的信息共享效率和联合共享的利用,并且降低了两位黑客的声誉。提供了政策和管理方面的含义。

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