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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >Finite Horizon Game for Voluntary Provision of a Discrete Public Good
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Finite Horizon Game for Voluntary Provision of a Discrete Public Good

机译:自愿提供离散公共物品的有限期博弈

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This paper analyzes a dynamic game for the provision of a discrete public good that will be provided only when a certain number of contributions are made. In each period players are randomly ordered and each player decides whether to contribute or not to the provision of the public good. If not enough contributions are made to provide the public good, the game goes to the next period and continue until the public good is either provided or the game ends at the final period. The paper first assumes symmetric players and shows that the exact period in which the public good will be provided is determined under subgame-perfect equilibria and that for some cost structures there will be a delay in provision of the public good. Counterintuitively, in some cases the public good is provided earlier at higher costs than at lower costs. The paper then introduces a partial public good, which requires fewer contributions to be provided but has a smaller value. We show that for some costs, introducing the partial public good eliminates the possibility of providing any kind of public good. For other cost structures, introducing the partial public good may improve social welfare. At last, asymmetric costs are introduced. The results are similar to the symmetric case.
机译:本文分析了提供离散公共物品的动态博弈,该博弈仅在做出一定数量的贡献时才会提供。在每个时期,都会随机安排玩家,每个玩家决定是否为提供公共物品做出贡献。如果没有做出足够的贡献来提供公共物品,则游戏进入下一个时期,并继续进行,直到提供公共物品或游戏在最后时期结束为止。本文首先假设参与者是对称的,并表明提供公共物品的确切期限是在子博弈完美均衡下确定的,并且对于某些成本结构,公共物品的提供会有所延迟。与直觉相反,在某些情况下,公共物品的提供成本较高,而成本较低。然后,本文介绍了部分公共物品,该物品要求提供的捐助较少,但价值较小。我们证明,由于某些成本,引入部分公共物品消除了提供任何种类的公共物品的可能性。对于其他成本结构,引入部分公共物品可能会改善社会福利。最后,引入了不对称成本。结果类似于对称情况。

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