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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
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Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

机译：专制机制：约束性组合拍卖中的专政形式

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摘要

We characterize the space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentiye compatible, individually rational, and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions where efficiency is not reauired. We examine a model with two players and k nonidentical items (2~k outcomes), multidimensional types, private values, non-negative prices, and auasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation - the players are subject to publicly-known budget constraints. We show that if it is publicly known that the players value the bundles more than the smaller of their budgets then the studied space includes one type of mechanism: autocratic mechanisms (a form of dictatorship). Furthermore, we prove that there are families of autocratic mechanisms that uniauely fulfill the basic properties of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentiye compatible, individually rational, and Pareto-optimal. Interestingly the above basic properties are a weaker reauirement than it may initially appear, as the property of Pareto optimality in our model of budget-constrained players and non-negative prices do not coincide with welfare maximization, i.e., efficiency as such is a much weaker reauirement.
机译：我们描述了在不保证效率的情况下确定性，主导策略不相容，个体理性和帕累托最优组合拍卖的空间。我们研究了一个模型，该模型具有两个参与者和k个不相同的项目（2〜k个结果），多维类型，私人价值，非负价格以及对参与者具有放松的偏好的线性偏好-参与者受到公知的预算约束。我们证明，如果众所周知，参与者对捆绑交易的重视程度高于其预算中的较小者，那么所研究的空间就包括一种机制：专制机制（独裁形式）。此外，我们证明了有专制机制家族可以毫不满足地满足确定性，主导战略难以相容，个体理性和帕累托最优的基本特征。有趣的是，上述基本属性的恢复能力比最初看起来要弱，因为在我们预算受限的参与者和非负价格模型中，帕累托最优的属性与福利最大化不符，即效率因此弱得多裁员。

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