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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >DYNAMICS OF CHOICE RESTRICTION IN LARGE GAMES
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DYNAMICS OF CHOICE RESTRICTION IN LARGE GAMES

机译：大型游戏中选择限制的动力学

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摘要

We study games in which the number of players are large, and hence outcomes are independent of the identities of the players. Game models typically study how choices made by individual rational players determine game outcomes. We extend this model to include an implicit player - the society, who makes actions available to players and incurs certain costs in doing so. In the course of play, an option a may be chosen only by a small number of players and hence may become too expensive to maintain, so the society may remove it from the set of available actions. This results in a change in the game and the players strategize afresh taking this change into account. We highlight the mutual recursiveness of individual rationality and societal rationality in this context. Specifically, we study two questions: When players play according to given strategy specifications, which actions of players should the society restrict and when, so that the social cost is minimized eventually? Conversely, assuming a set of rules by which society restricts choices, can players strategize in such a way as to ensure certain outcomes? We discuss solutions in finite memory strategies.
机译：我们研究玩家人数众多的游戏，因此结果与玩家的身份无关。游戏模型通常研究个体理性玩家的选择如何确定游戏结果。我们将此模型扩展为包括一个隐性参与者-社会，该社会向参与者提供操作并为此付出一定的成本。在游戏过程中，选项a只能由少数玩家选择，因此维护起来可能会变得过于昂贵，因此社会可能会将其从一系列可用动作中删除。这将导致游戏发生变化，并且玩家需要重新考虑这一变化来制定策略。我们强调了在这种情况下个人理性与社会理性的相互递归。具体来说，我们研究两个问题：当玩家根据给定的策略规格进行游戏时，社会应该限制玩家的行为以及何时限制社会行为，从而最终使社会成本最小化？相反，假设社会限制选择的一系列规则，参与者是否可以以确保某些结果的方式制定战略？我们讨论有限内存策略中的解决方案。

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