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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES
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NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES

机译：TU-GAMES中平衡联盟上的非核心型解

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摘要

In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the B-core and the M-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs (x,B), where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and B is a balanced family of coalitions, in the case of the B-core, and a minimal balanced one, in the case of the M-core, describing a plausible organization of the players to achieve the vector x. Both solutions extend the notion of classical core but, unlike it, they are always nonempty for any TU-game. For the M-core, which also exhibits a certain kind of "minimality" property, we provide a nice axiomatic characterization in terms of the four axioms nonemptiness (NB), individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA) and a weak reduced game property (WRGP) (with appropriate modifications to adapt them to the new framework) used to characterize the classical core. However, an additional axiom, the axiom of equal opportunity is required. It roughly states that if (x, B) belongs to the M-core then, any other admissible element of the form (x, S') should belong to the solution too.
机译：在本文中，我们介绍了两个相关的核心类型解决方案，用于具有B核心和M核心的可转移效用（TU游戏）的游戏。解的元素是对（x，B），其中x通常是表示效用分布的向量，B是B核的平衡族联盟，而B是最小的平衡族在M核的情况下，描述了实现矢量x的玩家合理组织。两种解决方案都扩展了经典核心的概念，但与之不同的是，它们对于任何TU游戏始终都是非空的。对于M核，它也表现出某种“最小”性质，我们根据四个公理的非空性（NB），个人理性（IR），超可加性（SUPA）和弱简化博弈来提供良好的公理化表征。属性（WRGP）（经过适当修改以使其适应新框架），以表征经典核心。但是，还需要另外一个公理，即机会均等公理。它粗略地指出，如果（x，B）属于M核，则（x，S'）形式的任何其他可允许元素也应属于解。

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