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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >TWO-STEP 'WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT' AND LEARNING TO COOPERATE IN THE REPEATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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TWO-STEP 'WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT' AND LEARNING TO COOPERATE IN THE REPEATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

机译：两步“胜利，失败了”，学习了重复主持人的困境

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The standard win-stay, lose-shift behavior strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game prescribes the players that win and lose in a current game round to keep and to change, respectively, their current actions, in the next round. Winning and losing are understood as receiving one of two upper values and one of two lower values, respectively, among the four admissible values for the players' benefits. In particular, a player acting as a cooperator against cooperation wins and therefore is not allowed to switch to defection in the next round with a hope to gain more (provided his/her rival keeps cooperating). This constraint can be viewed as too strong for a selfish player. Here, we discuss a two-step win-stay, lose-shift behavior that differs from the traditional win-stay lose-shift one in understanding of winning and losing. A player wins if his/her benefit is no smaller that in the previous round, and loses otherwise. This pattern is in a sense more selfish; in particular, a switch from cooperation (against cooperation) to defection is not forbidden. Another confirmation of a more selfish character of the two-step win-stay, lose-shift behavior, compared to the standard win-stay, lose-shift one, is that the former does not bring two individuals playing the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game to mutual cooperation. In this paper, our goal is to understand to what degree one can relax the two-step win-stay, lose-shift behavior in selfishness so as to reach mutual cooperation, anyway. We deal with two models of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game - a game of two individuals and a game in a group of players. In the game of two individuals, a relaxed two-step win-stay, lose-shift behavior assumes that the players use mixed strategies; here, relaxation is associated with patience. In the game in a group of players, relaxation is achieved through conformity, a tendency to join the majority. We show that even a small degree of conformity is enough to teach a two-step win-stay, lose-shift group to cooperate.
机译：在重复的《囚徒困境》游戏中，标准的制胜，失举行为策略规定了在当前游戏回合中获胜和失败的玩家在下一轮中分别保持和更改其当前行为。获胜者和获胜者被理解为分别获得球员利益的四个允许值中的两个较高值之一和两个较低值之一。尤其是，作为合作者对抗合作者的玩家获胜，因此不允许在下一轮中转向叛逃，以期获得更多收益（前提是他/她的对手保持合作）。对于一个自私的玩家来说，这种约束力太强了。在这里，我们讨论了两步制的“输赢”，“输班”行为，该行为与传统的“输赢”输班在理解输赢方面有所不同。如果玩家的收益不小于前一轮，则获胜，否则则输。从某种意义上说，这种模式更自私。特别是禁止从合作（反对合作）转向叛逃。与标准的“获胜，输班”相比，两步获胜，输班的行为更自私的另一个确认是，前者不会让两个人玩重复的《囚徒困境》游戏。互相合作。在本文中，我们的目标是了解一个人在多大程度上可以自私地放松两步走，走，走的行为，以达到相互合作的目的。我们处理重复囚徒困境游戏的两个模型-两个人的游戏和一组玩家的游戏。在两个人的游戏中，放松的两步制胜负，输班行为假设玩家使用混合策略；在这里，放松与耐心有关。在一组玩家的游戏中，放松是通过顺从来实现的，顺从是一种趋向多数的趋势。我们证明，即使是很小程度的整合也足以指导两步制胜负，输班制的团队合作。

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  • 来源
    《International game theory review》 |2010年第4期|p.437-451|共15页
  • 作者

    ARKADY KRYAZHIMSKIY;

  • 作者单位

    International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Laxenburg, Austria,Steklov Mathematical Institute Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia;

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