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STABLE COOPERATION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

机译:在环境约束下的稳定合作

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摘要

A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot compe?tition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock of accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for the whole duration of the game. We design a stable Shapley value as a cooperative solution, which is time-consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition. The numerical example is given.
机译:研究了在古诺竞争下的领土环境生产的博弈模型。该过程被建模为合作差分博弈。提出了参与者共同合作利益的稳定分配机制。我们证明了在整个博弈过程中,合作积累的污染物累积总量严格小于纳什均衡条件下的污染总量。我们设计一个稳定的Shapley值作为时间一致的合作解决方案。 Shapley值在战略上也很稳定,并且满足非理性行为证明条件。给出了数值示例。

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