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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >TRASH IT OR SELL IT? A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET INTRODUCTION OF PRODUCT INNOVATIONS
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TRASH IT OR SELL IT? A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET INTRODUCTION OF PRODUCT INNOVATIONS

机译：交易还是出售？对产品创新市场的战略分析

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摘要

In this paper a quantity-setting duopoly is considered where one firm develops a new product which is horizontally differentiated from the existing product. The main question examined is which strategically important effects occur if the decision to develop the innovation and the decision to introduce the new product in the market are separated. In our multi-stage game the firm's launch decision is explicitly taken into account. We find an equilibrium where the competitor of the potential innovator strategically over-invests in process innovation in order to push the potential innovator to introduce the new product since this reduces competition for the existing product. It is shown that this effect has positive welfare implications in comparison with the case where the innovator commits ex ante to launching the new product.
机译：在本文中，考虑了一个数量设定双头垄断，即一家公司开发与现有产品横向不同的新产品。研究的主要问题是，如果将开发创新的决定和将新产品推向市场的决定分开，会在战略上产生哪些重要影响。在我们的多阶段游戏中，明确考虑了公司的发布决定。我们发现了一个平衡点，潜在创新者的竞争对手在战略创新上进行了战略性过度投资，以推动潜在创新者推出新产品，因为这会减少对现有产品的竞争。结果表明，与创新者事前承诺推出新产品的情况相比，这种影响具有积极的福利意义。

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