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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >A TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADE
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A TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADE

机译：区域性差异游戏中关于污染和贸易的时间一致协议

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摘要

This paper studies a transboundary pollution problem between two neighbour regions as a dynamic game. These two regions do not only share an environmental problem but they are also engaged in interregional trade. A good produced in one region is traded to the other which uses it as an input. This intermediate good is supplied by the former and demanded by the latter. The supply-demand scheme determines the price and production of the intermediate good. Thus total production is fixed in both regions, and the emissions of pollutants are also determined as a by-product. Cooperation cuts down production and trade, and in consequence the emissions of pollutants. Therefore, the environmental gain from cooperation overcomes the shrink in the interregional trade. An allocation mechanism to share the surplus of cooperation is defined, which guarantees a time-consistent agreement between both regions.
机译：本文以动态博弈的方式研究了两个邻区之间的跨界污染问题。这两个地区不仅存在环境问题，而且还从事地区间贸易。在一个地区生产的商品被交易到另一地区，并以此作为输入。该中间商品由前者提供，而后者则需要。供需计划决定了中间商品的价格和生产。因此，两个地区的总产量是固定的，污染物的排放也被确定为副产品。合作减少了生产和贸易，因此减少了污染物的排放。因此，合作带来的环境收益克服了区域间贸易的萎缩。定义了一种分享剩余合作的分配机制，以确保两个区域之间达成时间一致的协议。

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