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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS
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A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS

机译：具有多个入口的反向复制游戏模型

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We consider a game-theoretic model of counterproliferation, in which a single Incumbent (holding nuclear weapons) is faced with a sequence of potential Entrants (who are considering developing and deploying a nuclear capability or other weapons of mass destruction of their own). The Incumbent can either choose to act preemptively, with certain costs, or allow the Entrants to deploy a nuclear capability, with consequent costs due to the potential for nuclear blackmail. How should each of the players decide? The players' decisions are optimally based not only on their own cost functions (which each knows) but also on their opponent's cost structure (which is known only in probability). Entrants (other than the first) can learn something about the Incumbent's cost structure from decisions they have made in the past. It turns out that, depending on a would-be Entrant's cost structure, a record of preemption by the Incumbent can have either a deterrent or provocation effect. Understanding the basis for each of these contradictory effects is critical to designing an optimal counterproliferation strategy.
机译：我们考虑一种反扩散的博弈论模型，其中一个任职者（持有核武器）面临一系列潜在进入者（他们正在考虑发展和部署核能力或其他自己的大规模杀伤性武器）。任职者可以选择采取先发制人的行动，并付出一定的代价，或者允许进入者部署核能力，由于存在潜在的核敲诈行为，因此会产生相应的代价。每个玩家应该如何决定？参与者的决策不仅基于自己的成本函数（每个人都知道），而且还基于对手的成本结构（仅以概率知道）最优。参赛者（除了第一个）可以从他们过去的决策中学到有关在职者成本结构的知识。事实证明，根据可能的进入者的成本结构，在位者先占的记录可能具有威慑作用或激发作用。了解每种矛盾作用的基础对于设计最佳的防扩散策略至关重要。

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