UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX

WOLFGANG R. KOEHLER

首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX

【24h】

UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX

机译：当支付集是非凸的时，鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型中的唯一均衡

获取原文

获取原文并翻译 | 示例

掌桥外文数据库（机构版） >>

开具论文收录证明 >>

文献代查 >>

页面导航

摘要
著录项
相似文献
相关主题

摘要

I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

机译：我在收益集上给出了必要和充分的条件，以保证鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型中均衡的唯一性。条件包括具有不连续帕累托边界的一类非凸或不连续的收益集。粗略地说，如果相应的纳什讨价还价博弈的目标函数具有唯一的最大值，则均衡是唯一的。我将分析扩展到两次报价之间的时间不是恒定的游戏。

著录项

来源
《International game theory review》 |2006年第3期|p.469-482|共14页
作者
WOLFGANG R. KOEHLER;
展开▼
作者单位

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zuerich, Winterthurerstr. 30 8006 Zuerich, Switzerland;

展开▼
收录信息
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类数理科学和化学;
关键词
bargaining;

机译：讨价还价;

相似文献

外文文献
中文文献
专利

1. Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining [J] . Evdokimov Kirill S. Economics letters . 2020,第Mara期

机译：讨价还价随机模型中均衡收益的唯一性
2. Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining [J] . Huelya Eraslan, Andrew McLennan Journal of economic theory . 2013,第6期

机译：联盟谈判中静态均衡收益的唯一性
3. On the core, nucleolus and bargaining sets of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs [J] . Zhang Xia, Sun Hao, Xu Genjiu, Journal of intelligent & fuzzy systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology . 2019,第6aPta2期

机译：论模糊收益的核心，核仁和谈判组合式游戏
4. Analysis for the bargaining confidence degree in relocation disputes based on the Rubinstein bargaining model [C] . Zhongfu Qin, Mingtao Zhang, Xiaolong Lei International Conference on Education Technology, Management and Humanities Science . 2015

机译：基于鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型的搬迁纠纷讨价还价置信度分析
5. Three models of spatial games: Dynamic payoffs and disordered networks. [D] . Tomochi, Masaki. 2003

机译：空间博弈的三种模型：动态收益和无序网络。
6. Parameter Set Uniqueness and Confidence Limits in Model Identification of Insulin Transport Models for Simulation Data Diabetic Patient Models [O] . Terry G. Farmer Jr., Thomas F. Edgar, Nicholas A. Peppas -1

机译：模拟数据糖尿病患者模型的胰岛素转运模型模型辨识中的参数集唯一性和置信度极限
7. Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex [O] . Köhler, Wolfgang R 2005

机译：当收益集是非凸的时，鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型中的唯一均衡

UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX

摘要

著录项

相似文献

相关主题

期刊订阅