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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >MANAGER, WORKER, RENTIER AND GOVERNMENT: MARKOV AND NON-MARKOVIAN PLAY
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MANAGER, WORKER, RENTIER AND GOVERNMENT: MARKOV AND NON-MARKOVIAN PLAY

机译:经理,工人,租户和政府:马可夫和非马可夫的游戏

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摘要

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents is feedback. The equilibrium that results is, therefore, not subgame perfect. Enter the government that produces a good that complements the existing good. It is financed by the issue of money that substitutes for the asset. The enlargement of the state space of the game induces cooperation between the agents.
机译:我们将代表代理分解为经理,工人和食客自己。准则是重复游戏的每个阶段的每个“知识”的信息集。食人者的信息集包括预期信息,而其他代理的信息集为反馈。因此,产生的均衡不是子博弈的完美。进入生产与现有商品互补的商品的政府。它由代替资产的金钱问题来资助。游戏状态空间的扩大引起了代理之间的合作。

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