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Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

机译:量化纳什均衡中的承诺

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摘要

To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.
机译:为了量化玩家在有限动态游戏的给定Nash均衡中的投入,我们将对应的范式博弈映射到“规范扩展”,这允许每个玩家以一定的概率调整其移动。承诺度量与平均总体调整概率有关,对于该平均给定的纳什均衡,可以将其实现为规范扩展中的子博弈完美均衡。

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