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Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits

机译:分散的各种尺寸的匹配市场:类似地稳定的解决方案,具有高比例的平均分裂

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摘要

In two-sided matching markets where direct negotiations take place over the division of profits between the partners, the appropriate solution concept is the core. Only a minority of the experimentally observed bargaining results are within the core, and the number of core solutions further decreases with an increase in market complexity. For differently-sized matching markets, two adjustments to the core requirements are introduced. Projected cores from smaller markets (partial condition core) are confirmed in larger markets. The possibility of Pareto improvements from the perspective of individual players (individual condition core) does not vanish but may even increase with market size. In all the investigated experimental markets, a high percentage of equal profit splits between matching partners in face-to-face bargaining was found, especially in larger, decentralized matching markets.
机译:在双面匹配市场中,直接谈判在合作伙伴之间的利润分工,适当的解决方案概念是核心。只有少数实验观察到的讨价还价结果在核心内,核心解决方案的数量进一步降低了市场复杂性。对于不同大小的匹配市场,介绍了两种对核心要求的调整。来自较小市场的预计核心(部分条件核心)在较大的市场中确认。从个人参与者(个体状况核心)的角度来看帕累托改进的可能性不会消失,但甚至可能会随市场规模而增加。在所有调查的实验市场中,发现匹配合作伙伴面对面讨价还价的匹配合作伙伴之间的高百分比相同的利润分裂,特别是在较大,分散的匹配市场中。

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