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Game-Theoretic Principles of Decision Management Modeling Under the Coopetition

机译：作业下决策管理建模的游戏 - 理论原则

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The paper considers the two main game-theoretic models, such as coalition and cooperative. The authors are of the opinion that definitions and notions of cooperative games and coalition games are different, but both games are coopetitive games. Transitivity and superadditivity are presented as the main characteristic functions of coopetitive games. The individual and collective rationality were identified as unconditional requirements for the optimal distribution between players. Furthermore, the additional income added to the guaranteed amount occurs in the event of coopetition. Any substantial coopetitive game has an infinite number of transactions. The authors highlighted that the dominant transaction is the transaction that is better for all coalition numbers without exceptions and it can be reached by the coalition. In addition, the authors propose using Shapley system of axioms to identify coopetitive game results.
机译：本文考虑了两种主要的游戏理论模型，如联盟和合作。作者认为合作游戏和联盟比赛的定义和概念不同，但两场比赛都是合作游戏。转运和超额度被呈现为合作游戏的主要特征功能。个人和集体合理性被确定为玩家之间最佳分配的无条件要求。此外，在合作时，增加了担保金额的额外收入。任何实质性的合作游戏都有无限数量的交易。作者强调了主导交易是对所有联盟号码的交易，无例外情况更好，并可通过联盟达成。此外，作者提出使用福利的公理系统来识别合作游戏结果。

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