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首页> 外文期刊>International Insolvency Review >Rethinking priority: The dawn of the relative priority rule and the new 'best interests of creditors' test in the European Union
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Rethinking priority: The dawn of the relative priority rule and the new 'best interests of creditors' test in the European Union

机译:重新思考优先:相对优先级规则的曙光和欧盟在债权人的新“最佳利益”

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摘要

This article identifies one aspect of the cross-class cram-down from the EU Directive on restructuring and insolvency that has not drawn wide attention to date. In addition to giving EU Member States the option of a "relative priority rule," the European legislator has introduced a new "best interest of creditors" test, which does not-like in Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code-use the value that a party could expect in a hypothetical liquidation as a comparator but refers to the "next-best-alternative scenario." First, this article addresses the concepts of the absolute and relative priority rule from the Directive and explores the motives for introducing the relative priority rule. In particular, a demand for more flexibility in restructuring negotiations, the call for an instrument to overcome structural hold-out positions of preferential (priority) creditors in some Member States, as well as a trend in Europe to break with the "traditional laws of insolvency law" of law and economics seem to have inspired the legislator in drawing up the relative priority rule. This article then deals with the new "best interest" test and examines its interaction with the relative priority rule. It is shown that the concept of combining the new "best interest" test with the relative priority rule is coherent in theory. However, this article remains skeptical as to whether this interaction can succeed in practice, as the new "best interest" test is likely to add another stress point to the negotiations of restructuring plans.
机译:本文从欧盟指令上确定了关于重组和破产的欧盟指令的一个方面,这些内容迄今尚未引起广泛的关注。除了为欧盟成员国提供“相对优先级规则”的选择外,欧洲立法机已经向美国破产守则的第11章中推出了新的“最佳债权人”测试,这是不合作的派对可以预期假设的清算作为比较者,但指“下一个最佳替代方案”。首先,本文解决了来自指令的绝对和相对优先级规则的概念,并探讨了引入相对优先级规则的动机。特别是对重组谈判的更具灵活性的需求,呼吁仪器克服一些成员国在一些成员国中的优惠(优先权)债权人的结构阻止立场,以及欧洲的趋势与“传统法律” “法律和经济学的破产法”似乎启发了立法者在制定相对优先级规则方面。然后,本文处理新的“最佳利益”测试,并审查其与相对优先级规则的互动。结果表明,与相对优先级规则结合新的“最佳兴趣”测试的概念在理论上是连贯的。但是,本文仍然持怀疑态度,因为这种互动是否可以在实践中成功,因为新的“最佳利益”测试可能会增加另一个压力点,以增加重组计划的谈判。

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  • 来源
    《International Insolvency Review》 |2021年第1期|75-95|共21页
  • 作者

    Krohn Axel;

  • 作者单位

    Martin Luther Univ Halle Wittenberg Halle Germany;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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