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Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post-Civil War States

机译:内战定居点,执政联盟的规模以及内战后国家的和平持久性

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We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post-civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post-civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post-civil war peace spells from 1946-2005.View full textDownload full textKeywordscivil war settlements, power-sharing, size of governing coalition, survival of peaceRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.622645
机译:我们研究内战后国家的执政联盟规模如何影响和平的持久性。先前的研究将和平的持久性与内战的结果,权力共享安排的程度和形式以及第三方安全保证者的作用联系起来。我们认为,冲突的终结方式和前主角之间的权力分享协议构成了内战后国家执政联盟的组成。任何扩大内政联盟规模的内战解决办法,都应增加行动者维持和平而不是重新武装冲突的动力。在执政联盟规模较小的地方,和平更有可能失败,因为那些被排除在执政联盟之外的人几乎不会因为恢复武装叛乱而蒙受损失。为了检验这些主张,我们分析了1946年至2005年内战后和平法术的数据。查看全文下载全文关键词内战定居点,权力共享,执政联盟的规模,和平的生存相关的var addthis_config = {在线”,services_compact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,可口,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布号:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.622645

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