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首页> 外文期刊>International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations >Power, Preferences, and Multiple Levels of Interstate Conflict
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Power, Preferences, and Multiple Levels of Interstate Conflict

机译：权力，偏好和州际冲突的多个层次

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The purpose of this article is to reevaluate arguments that relate states' power to the likelihood of interstate conflict, by highlighting the conditional effect of preferences on the relationship between power and conflict. Also, it examines whether the conditional role of preferences works differently at two different levels of conflict—militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and War. With respect to the onset of MIDs, power disparity is likely to decrease the chances of conflict, and this pacifying effect increases as states' preferences become similar. However, when states have very divergent preferences, this dissimilarity becomes a dominant factor in the process of conflict decision making and thus the pacifying effect of power disparity on MID onsets disappears. In fact, power disparity increases the chances of fighting. Meanwhile, when states make costly decisions of war, relative national capabilities become a significant factor in the decision of fighting, and preferences do not have conditional effects on the exercise of power. In this case, power disparity reduces the chances of fighting, regardless of the level of preference dissimilarity. In sum, this paper provides an explanation for diverse theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the previous studies of power and conflict, highlighting the relative importance of power and preferences at different levels of conflict.View full textDownload full textKeywordsMIDs, power distribution, preference dissimilarity, warRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2010.502424
机译：本文的目的是通过强调偏好对权力与冲突之间关系的条件影响，重新评估将国家权力与州际冲突可能性联系起来的论点。此外，它研究了优惠的条件作用在冲突的两个不同级别（军事化的州际争端（MID）和战争）是否有不同的作用。关于MID的发作，权力不均很可能会减少冲突的机会，而且随着各州的偏好变得相似，这种安抚效果也会增加。但是，当国家的偏好差异很大时，这种差异成为冲突决策过程中的主要因素，因此，权力差异对MID发作的缓解作用消失了。实际上，权力悬殊增加了战斗的机会。同时，当国家做出昂贵的战争决定时，相对的国家能力将成为决定战斗的重要因素，而优惠不会对行使权力产生条件性影响。在这种情况下，无论偏好差异的程度如何，权力差异都会减少战斗的机会。综上所述，本文为先前权力和冲突研究中的各种理论论证和经验发现提供了解释，强调了权力和偏好在不同冲突级别上的相对重要性。查看全文下载全文关键字MID，权力分布，偏好差异， warRelated var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand：“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”，servicescompact：“ citeulike，netvibes，twitter，technorati，delicious，linkedin，facebook，stumbleupon，digg，google，更多”，发布号：“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2010.502424

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