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Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks

机译:无线传感器网络中带有前向博弈节点的自私节点激励机制研究

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摘要

In a wireless sensor network, some nodes may act selfishly and noncooperatively, such as not forwarding packets, in response to their own limited resources. If most of the nodes in a network exhibit this selfish behavior, the entire network will be paralyzed, and it will not be able to provide normal service. This paper considers implementing the idea of evolutionary game theory into the nodes of wireless sensor networks to effectively improve the reliability and stability of the networks. We present a new model for the selfish node incentive mechanism with a forward game node for wireless sensor networks, and we discuss applications of the replicator dynamics mechanism to analyze evolutionary trends of trust relationships among nodes. We analyzed our approach theoretically and conducted simulations based on the idea of evolutionary game theory. The results of the simulation indicated that a wireless sensor network that uses the incentive mechanism can forward packets well while resisting any slight variations. Thus, the stability and reliability of wireless sensor networks are improved. We conducted numerical experiments, and the results verified our conclusions based on the theoretical analysis.
机译:在无线传感器网络中,某些节点可能会响应其自身有限的资源而自私且不合作地行动,例如不转发数据包。如果网络中的大多数节点都表现出这种自私的行为,则整个网络将瘫痪,并且将无法提供正常服务。本文考虑将进化博弈论的思想应用于无线传感器网络的节点中,以有效地提高网络的可靠性和稳定性。我们提出了一种用于无线传感器网络的带有前向博弈节点的自私节点激励机制的新模型,并讨论了复制器动态机制在分析节点之间信任关系的演变趋势中的应用。我们从理论上分析了我们的方法,并基于进化博弈论的思想进行了模拟。仿真结果表明,使用激励机制的无线传感器网络可以很好地转发数据包,同时还能抵抗任何细微的变化。因此,提高了无线传感器网络的稳定性和可靠性。我们进行了数值实验,结果在理论分析的基础上证实了我们的结论。

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  • 来源
    《International journal of antennas and propagation》 |2017年第4期|8591206.1-8591206.13|共13页
  • 作者单位

    Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China;

    Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China;

    Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China;

    Staffordshire Univ, Sch Comp & Digital Technol, Stoke On Trent ST4 2DE, Staffs, England;

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