...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>International journal of electrical power and energy systems >Data-driven detection for GPS spoofing attack using phasor measurements in smart grid
【24h】

Data-driven detection for GPS spoofing attack using phasor measurements in smart grid

机译：使用Phasor测量在智能电网中的PPS欺骗攻击数据驱动检测

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

As the ?GridEye?, the wide area measurement system (WAMS) can provide the synchronized measurements for many applications in smart grid based on the geographically dispersed phasor measurement units (PMUs). However, most PMUs rely on the civil GPS/BDS (BeiDou navigation satellite system) signal as the time source and are vulnerable to GPS spoofing attack (GSA), which would deteriorate the PMU based applications. Compared to cyber-attack, the GSA can destroy the data integrity without the need of access to the physical network which makes the GSA more threatening. In this paper, two simple but effective and automatic detection methods for the GSA are proposed, which are based on monitoring the changes of estimated line reactance using PMU data: 1) method based on historical statistics and 2) method based on abrupt change index which is widely used in digital relays. In addition, the types of GSA can be identified. The proposed methods are data-driven, i.e., it needs the PMU data at both ends of the transmission line and does not require knowing the line parameters and the system topology. The adaptive thresholds are used to make the methods determine the threshold automatically and balance the sensitivity and robustness for GSA detection. The reliability and superiority of the proposed methods are demonstrated with simulated and measured PMU data.
机译：作为？Gideye？，宽面积测量系统（WAMS）可以基于地理上分散的Phasor测量单元（PMU）为智能电网中的许多应用提供同步测量。然而，大多数PMU都依赖于民用GPS / BDS（Beidou导航卫星系统）信号作为时间源，并且容易受到GPS欺骗攻击（GSA）的影响，这将恶化基于PMU的应用程序。与网络攻击相比，GSA可以破坏数据完整性，而无需访问物理网络，这使得GSA更威胁。在本文中，提出了两个简单但有效的GSA自动检测方法，基于基于历史统计和2）方法的PMU数据的估计线路电抗的变化，基于突然变化索引的方法广泛用于数字继电器。此外，可以识别GSA的类型。所提出的方法是数据驱动的，即，它需要在传输线的两端都需要PMU数据，并且不需要了解行参数和系统拓扑。自适应阈值用于使方法自动确定阈值并平衡GSA检测的灵敏度和鲁棒性。用模拟和测量的PMU数据对所提出的方法的可靠性和优越性进行了说明。

著录项

  • 来源
    《International journal of electrical power and energy systems》 |2021年第7期|106883.1-106883.16|共16页
  • 作者

    Xue Ancheng; Xu Feiyang; Chow Joe H.; Leng Shuang; Kong He; Xu Jingsong; Bi Tianshu;

  • 作者单位

    North China Elect Power Univ State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl Beijing 102206 Peoples R China;

    North China Elect Power Univ State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl Beijing 102206 Peoples R China;

    Rensselaer Polytech Inst RPI Dept Elect Comp & Syst Engn Troy NY 12180 USA;

    North China Elect Power Univ State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl Beijing 102206 Peoples R China;

    North China Elect Power Univ State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl Beijing 102206 Peoples R China;

    North China Elect Power Univ State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl Beijing 102206 Peoples R China|State Grid Ningxia Yinchuan Elect Power Co Yinchuan 750001 Ningxia Peoples R China;

    North China Elect Power Univ State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl Beijing 102206 Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    GPS spoofing attack; Attack detection; Phasor measurement unit; Line reactance; Time synchronization problem;

    机译：GPS欺骗攻击;攻击检测;Phasor测量单元;线路电抗;时间同步问题;

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号