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Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures

机译：Harsanyi电力解决方案，适用于投票结构的合作游戏

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摘要

This paper deals with Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on specific union stable systems given by the winning coalitions derived from a voting game. This framework allows for analyzing new and real situations in which there exists a feedback between the economic influence of each coalition of agents and its political power. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi power solutions on the subclass of union stable systems arisen from the winning coalitions from a voting game when the influence is determined by a power index. In particular, we establish comparable axiomatizations, in this context, when considering the Shapley-Shubik power index, the Banzhaf index and the Equal division power index which reduces to the Myerson value on union stable systems. Finally, a new characterization for the Harsanyi power solutions on the whole class of union stable systems is provided and, as a consequence, a characterization of the Myerson value is obtained when the equal power measure is considered.
机译：本文涉及合作游戏的Harsanyi Power解决方案，其中部分合作是基于由投票游戏的获奖联盟提供的特定工会稳定系统。该框架允许分析新的和实际情况，其中存在每联盟的经济影响和其政治权力之间存在反馈。我们提供了在从投票游戏的获奖联盟中出现的联盟稳定系统的子类上的哈尔萨尼电力解决方案的公理表征，当受到功率指数的影响时，从投票游戏中出现。特别是，我们在这种情况下建立了可比的公理化，在这种情况下，考虑到福普利 - Shubik电力指数，BANZHAF指数和等分部电力指数，这减少了与联盟稳定系统的Myerson价值减少。最后，提供了在整类联合稳定系统上的Harsanyi电力解决方案的新表征，并且因此，当考虑等电功率测量时，获得了Myerson值的表征。

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