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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Innovative Computing Information and Control >A NOVEL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON CUBIC RESIDUE WITH PROVABLE SECURITY
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A NOVEL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON CUBIC RESIDUE WITH PROVABLE SECURITY

机译:基于具有可证明安全性的立体残差的新型数字签名方案

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摘要

Since a single computationally hard problem today may possibly be solved efficiently in the future, many researchers endeavored in recent years to base their cryp-tosystem security on solving two or more hard problems simultaneously to enhance the system security. However, it is found that many previously suggested signature schemes with their (1) security based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems and with (2) verification equation using exponential quadratic forms were not as secure as claimed and gave no provable security under the random oracle model. We, therefore, use the theory of cubic residues to present a new signature scheme with an exponential cubic verification equation to prevent the attack from Pollard-Schnorr's congruence solutions and give a formal proof of the scheme security by random oracle modeling. We formally prove that, based on solving the discrete logarithm problem with a composite modulus (which has been shown by Bach in 1984 to be exactly as hard as simultaneously solving the integer factorization and the discrete logarithm with a prime modulus), the proposed scheme is resistant against both no-message and adaptively chosen-message attacks.
机译:由于今天的单个计算难题可能会在将来得到有效解决,因此近年来,许多研究人员都在努力使他们的催泪系统安全性同时解决两个或多个难题,以增强系统安全性。但是,发现许多以前建议的签名方案,其(1)基于整数分解和离散对数问题的安全性,以及(2)使用指数二次形式的验证方程,没有所要求的安全性,并且在随机情况下没有可证明的安全性oracle模型。因此,我们使用三次余数理论提出了一个具有指数三次验证方程的新签名方案,以防止Pollard-Schnorr的全等解受到攻击,并通过随机Oracle建模对方案的安全性进行了正式证明。我们正式证明,基于求解具有复合模量的离散对数问题(Bach于1984年证明它与同时求解整数分解和具有质数模的离散对数一样困难),所提出的方案是抵抗无消息攻击和自适应选择消息攻击。

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