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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Law and Management >US “say-on-pay” legislation: Is it corporate governance overreach?
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US “say-on-pay” legislation: Is it corporate governance overreach?

机译：美国“按付款说”立法：是公司治理过度吗？

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues surrounding “say-on-pay” legislation in the USA; evaluate the corporate governance alternatives to “say-on-pay” legislation; recommend a policy encouraging enhanced executive accountability; and suggest research questions pertaining to “say-on-pay” proposals and executive compensation for scholars to pursue. Design/methodology/approach – The paper takes an exploratory approach to discussing and analyzing the issues surrounding “say-on-pay” legislation in the USA and offering an alternative corporate governance approach to enhancing executive performance. Findings – The paper finds that whether an annual non-binding “say-on-pay” policy is instituted or not within a company is not the crux of the executive compensation issue. What is important is whether concerned shareholders have the ability to have proxy access and successfully pass such a resolution, thereby exercising shareholder pressure on the board of directors to implement a corporate policy of equating appropriate executive compensation with managerial performance. Moreover, this improvement in board-shareowner engagement, along with expanded disclosure of executive compensation packages, will assist in obviating the need for the exercise of a draconian shareholder resolution to remove directors. Originality/value – This paper offers an in-depth review of the “say-on-pay” legislative and corporate governance controversy; places the issue in the context of effective corporate governance; recommends a reasoned approach to executive compensation accountability; and offers a list of research questions for corporate governance and human resource management scholars to pursue.
机译：目的–本文的目的是讨论美国围绕“按酬付费”立法的问题；评估“按付款说法”立法的公司治理替代方案；建议一项政策，以加强执行人员的责任感；并提出与“按付款说”建议和行政补偿有关的研究问题，供学者追究。设计/方法/方法–本文采用探索性方法来讨论和分析围绕美国“按薪付费”立法的问题，并提供一种替代的公司治理方法来提高执行绩效。调查结果–该论文发现，是否在公司内部制定年度不具约束力的“按酬说”政策并不是高管薪酬问题的症结所在。重要的是，相关股东是否具有获得代理人访问权并成功通过此类决议的能力，从而对董事会施加股东压力，以实施将适当的高管薪酬与管理绩效相提并论的公司政策。此外，董事会与股东之间关系的改善以及对高管薪酬方案披露的扩大，将有助于消除执行严厉的股东罢免董事决议的需要。独创性/价值–本文深入探讨了“按说付费”的立法和公司治理争议；将问题放在有效的公司治理范围内；建议对高管薪酬问责制采取合理的方法；并为公司治理和人力资源管理学者提供了一系列研究问题。

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