• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>International journal of management science and engineering management >Corporate social responsibility, channel coordination and profit division in a two-echelon supply chain
【24h】

Corporate social responsibility, channel coordination and profit division in a two-echelon supply chain

机译：两级供应链中的企业社会责任，渠道协调和利润分配

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper deals with coordination and profit division in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain with corporate social responsibility (CSR). Considering the retailer to be socially responsible in one case, and the manufacturer to be so in another, the paper applies a quantity discount contract to resolve channel conflict. It is found that the retailer's perfect welfare maximizing motive is enough for channel coordination. When a channel member is not the perfect welfare maximizer, a quantity discount contract cuts out channel conflict. The wholesale price of a quantity discount contract is different from that of a traditional profit maximizing supply chain. It may be equal to the manufacturer's decentralized wholesale price in one case, and negative for CSR above a certain threshold in another. Also, the manufacturer's pure profit may be negative if it puts a heavy weight on CSR. Using the Nash bargaining product, the surplus profit is divided between the channel members. It is found that, for pure profit, a channel member always prefers the other members to be corporately socially responsible.
机译：本文讨论具有企业社会责任（CSR）的制造商-零售商供应链中的协调和利润分配。考虑到零售商在一种情况下对社会负责，而制造商在另一种情况下对社会负责，则本文采用了数量折扣合同来解决渠道冲突。发现零售商的最大福利最大化动机足以进行渠道协调。当渠道成员不是完美的福利最大化者时，数量折扣合同可以消除渠道冲突。数量折扣合同的批发价格不同于传统的利润最大化供应链。在一种情况下，它可能等于制造商的去中心化批发价格，而在另一种情况下，它对高于一定阈值的企业社会责任为负。此外，如果制造商的纯利润重于企业社会责任，则可能会为负数。使用纳什讨价还价产品，盈余利润在渠道成员之间分配。已经发现，为了获得纯利润，渠道成员总是希望其他成员对企业负有社会责任。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号