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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Manpower >Market power, dismissal threat, and rent sharing: The role of insider and outsider forces in wage bargaining
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Market power, dismissal threat, and rent sharing: The role of insider and outsider forces in wage bargaining

机译：市场力量，解雇威胁和房租分担：内幕和外幕力量在工资谈判中的作用

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Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate to what extent the existence of high labor adjustment costs has some influence on the process of wage negotiation. In particular, it aims to analyse if the risk of being laid off has any impact on insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, on their wage claims. Design/methodology/approach – A collective bargaining model that closely follows those developed by Nickell et al. and Bentolila and Dolado is adopted and a longitudinal panel of large Portuguese firms from all sectors over the 1993-199 period is used. Findings – The results reveal that firms where insider workers appear to have more bargaining power tend to pay higher wages. In particular, we found that the threat of dismissal tends to weaken insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, to depress wages. Research limitations/implications – In future research an attempt should be made to measure directly the labor turnover costs. Originality/value – This paper presents robust empirical evidence using micro-data for individual firms that support one of the predictions of the insider-outsider theory that wages will be higher in sectors (firms) with high labor turnover costs.
机译：目的–这项研究的目的是调查高劳动力调整成本的存在在多大程度上对工资谈判的过程产生影响。特别是，它旨在分析​​被解雇的风险是否对内部人员的议价能力，进而对他们的工资要求产生任何影响。设计/方法/方法–一种集体谈判模型，紧跟Nickell等人开发的模型。并采用了Bentolila和Dolado，并使用了1993-199年间来自各个部门的大型葡萄牙公司的纵向面板。调查结果–结果表明，内部人员似乎具有更大议价能力的公司倾向于支付更高的工资。尤其是，我们发现解雇的威胁往往会削弱内部人员的议价能力，从而降低工资。研究的局限性/意义–在将来的研究中，应尝试直接衡量劳动力流动成本。独创性/价值–本文使用微观数据为单个公司提供了有力的经验证据，这些公司支持内部人-局外人理论的一项预测，即在劳动力周转成本较高的行业（公司）中，工资将更高。

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