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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >Online market entry and channel sharing strategy with direct selling diseconomies in the sharing economy era
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Online market entry and channel sharing strategy with direct selling diseconomies in the sharing economy era

机译：共享经济时代下具有直销不经济因素的在线市场进入和渠道共享策略

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Channel sharing is an important marketing strategy for giant retailers who sell their own store brands and resell national brands for cooperative manufacturers simultaneously. To expand their market and increase profitability, national brand manufacturers may consider entering the online market through direct selling. To counter such threats, retailers may adopt a channel sharing strategy on whether to terminate the national brand product-reselling business. We analyze three scenarios, namely, the base scenario (the retailer sells both brands), the dual channel scenario (the manufacturer enters the online market while the retailer sells both brands), and the termination scenario (each firm sells their own brand because of the retailer's termination of the reselling business) to investigate the strategic interactions between the retailer and the manufacturer. We find that the termination of channel sharing by the retailer is an ineffective threat to prevent the manufacturer from entering the online market when the direct selling diseconomy is relatively low; otherwise, the effectiveness of the retailer's threat hinges on the store brand's quality. Specifically, the retailer's threat is valid if the store brand products' quality is low, whereas such threat is invalid if the store brand's quality is high. Interestingly, our results also reveal that the retailer's profit suffers "a cliff-like drop" in the store brands quality level. This finding suggests that selling a higher quality store brand may hurt the retailer's profit once the store brand's quality exceeds a certain threshold.
机译：对于大型零售商而言，渠道共享是一项重要的营销策略，这些零售商出售自己的商店品牌并同时向合作制造商转售民族品牌。为了扩大市场并增加利润，民族品牌制造商可以考虑通过直销进入在线市场。为了应对此类威胁，零售商可以针对是否终止民族品牌产品转售业务采取渠道共享策略。我们分析了三种情况，即基本情况（零售商同时销售两个品牌），双渠道情况（制造商进入在线市场，而零售商同时销售两个品牌）和终止情况（每个公司都销售自己的品牌，原因是零售商终止转售业务）以调查零售商与制造商之间的战略互动。我们发现，零售商的渠道共享终止是无效的威胁，无法阻止制造商在直销经济不畅时进入在线市场。否则，零售商威胁的有效性取决于商店品牌的质量。具体地，如果商店品牌产品的质量低，则零售商的威胁是有效的，而如果商店品牌产品的质量高，则零售商的威胁是无效的。有趣的是，我们的结果还表明，零售商的利润在商店品牌质量水平上遭受了“悬崖式下降”。该发现表明，一旦商店品牌的质量超过某个阈值，出售更高质量的商店品牌可能会损害零售商的利润。

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