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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >Information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with technology licensing
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Information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with technology licensing

机译：具有技术许可的闭环供应链中的信息共享

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摘要

This paper analyzes the benefits of information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor and a third party under technology licensing. The distributor has access to private market demand information and decides whether to share information with the manufacturer. We investigate three kinds of remanufacturing scenarios, namely (1) the manufacturer taking the responsibility for remanufacturing, (2) the manufacturer licensing the distributor to undertake remanufacturing, (3) the manufacturer licensing the third party to conduct remanufacturing. We adopt Stackelberg game to obtain equilibrium decisions of each remanufacturing scenario with/without information sharing. We show that, regardless of whether technology licensing exists in remanufacturing models, information sharing always results in a profit increase to the manufacturer and the third party, whilst a profit loss to the distributor. Such profit loss of the distributor can be effectively reduced with the introduction of technology licensing in each remanufacturing model. As for the remanufacturing choice, if the distributor/the third-party saving unit cost is high enough, the manufacturer would prefer distributor/third-party remanufacturing mode with information sharing instead of manufacturer-remanufacturing mode as he could share more remanufacturing benefits by charging a licensing fee from the distributor/the third party. Our study extends and complements prior research that has only examined remanufacturing mode combined with either technology licensing or information sharing.
机译：本文分析了在技术许可下与制造商，分销商和第三方在闭环供应链中共享信息的好处。分销商可以访问私人市场需求信息，并决定是否与制造商共享信息。我们研究了三种再制造方案，即（1）制造商负责再制造，（2）制造商许可分销商进行再制造，（3）制造商许可第三方进行再制造。我们采用Stackelberg博弈来获得有/无信息共享的每个再制造场景的均衡决策。我们表明，无论再制造模型中是否存在技术许可，信息共享始终会给制造商和第三方带来利润增加，而给分销商带来利润损失。通过在每个再制造模型中引入技术许可，可以有效减少分销商的这种利润损失。至于再制造选择，如果分销商/第三方节省的单位成本足够高，那么制造商会更喜欢通过信息共享的分销商/第三方再制造模式，而不是制造商再制造模式，因为他可以通过收取费用来分享更多的再制造收益。经销商/第三方的许可费。我们的研究扩展并补充了仅研究再制造模式与技术许可或信息共享相结合的先前研究。

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