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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >The value of partnership under competition: When competitors may be R&D joint-venture and supply-chain partners for a critical component
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The value of partnership under competition: When competitors may be R&D joint-venture and supply-chain partners for a critical component

机译：竞争下合作伙伴关系的价值：当竞争者可能是研发的合资企业和供应链合作伙伴的关键组成部分时

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摘要

Conventional wisdom suggests that firms are worse off when the intensity of competition increases. However, when competitors have the option of cooperating as supply-chain and R&D joint venture (RJV) partners, the findings may be counterintuitive. In this paper, we consider two competing firms that must develop a critical component for their products. They must decide whether to develop a distinct component or to form an RJV with their competitor in order to develop a common component, and how much research effort should be exerted to improve the quality of this component. Forming an RJV partnership reduces R&D investment because both firms are jointly responsible for the research cost, but customers perceive the products to be less differentiated, thus leading to a more intense degree of competition between products. Moreover, one of the manufacturers does not produce this component and must therefore decide whether to outsource the production of this component to its competitor or to a third-party supplier. We examine the following two drivers of competition: (1) competition because the two base products are substitutable and (2) when the two firms form an RJV to develop a common component, the competition between these two products intensifies. Our main results show that both firms are better off when the competitiveness of the industry increases or when forming an RJV intensifies the competition between two products. Moreover, we investigate the robustness of our results to the firms' bargaining powers by considering a generalized Nash bargaining game where firms negotiate on the RJV partnership decision, and we find that unless the supplier has a very large bargaining power, our results hold. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：传统观点认为，随着竞争强度的增加，企业的处境会更糟。但是，如果竞争对手可以选择作为供应链和R＆D合资企业（RJV）的合作伙伴进行合作，则发现可能与直觉相反。在本文中，我们考虑两家必须为其产品开发关键组件的竞争公司。他们必须决定是开发独特的组件还是与竞争对手形成RJV，以开发通用组件，以及应该花费多少研究工作来提高该组件的质量。建立合资企业伙伴关系可以减少研发投入，因为两家公司共同承担研究成本，但是客户认为产品差异化较小，因此导致产品之间的竞争更加激烈。而且，其中一个制造商不生产此组件，因此必须决定是将该组件的生产外包给其竞争对手还是第三方供应商。我们研究了以下两个竞争驱动因素：（1）因为两个基本产品是可替代的，所以竞争；（2）当两个公司组建合资公司以开发一个公共组件时，这两个产品之间的竞争加剧了。我们的主要结果表明，当行业竞争力提高或成立合资企业加剧两种产品之间的竞争时，两家公司的状况都会更好。此外，我们通过考虑企业就RJV伙伴关系决定进行谈判的广义Nash讨价还价游戏来研究结果对公司讨价还价能力的鲁棒性，并且我们发现除非供应商具有很大的讨价还价能力，否则我们的结果将成立。 （C）2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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