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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >Reward-penalty mechanism for closed-loop supply chains under responsibility-sharing and different power structures
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Reward-penalty mechanism for closed-loop supply chains under responsibility-sharing and different power structures

机译：分担责任和不同权力结构下闭环供应链的奖惩机制

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摘要

We study responsibility sharing in waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) collection between the manufacturer and the collector, and identify a reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for government to motivate industry's recycling endeavor. We develop several RPMs for different closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) under various channel power structures, including the manufacturer-led and the collector-led closed-loop supply chains, and those with and without government RPM. We find that increasing the reward-penalty intensity can improve the WEEE collection and lower product price. From the collection rate improvement perspective, the collector-led is a better channel structure of CLSC compared with centralized and manufacturer-led channel structure. Social welfare increases when both reward-penalty intensity and the CLSC leader's responsibility ratio are high. The government's RPM should satisfy two conditions: (i) under high reward-penalty intensity, more responsibility should be assigned to the CLSC leader; (ii) if the CLSC is collector-led, her responsibility ratio must be higher than 1/3 in order to enhance the collection rate. Similarly, the ratio of responsibility in the manufacturer-led case must be greater than 2/3 to improve the collection rate. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：我们研究制造商和收集者之间在废弃电子电气设备（WEEE）收集中的责任分担，并确定奖惩机制（RPM），以鼓励政府推动行业的回收工作。我们为各种渠道动力结构下的不同闭环供应链（CLSC）开发了几个RPM，包括制造商主导和收集者主导的闭环供应链，以及有和没有政府RPM的供应链。我们发现，增加奖惩力度可以改善WEEE收集并降低产品价格。从提高收集率的角度来看，与集中式和制造商主导的渠道结构相比，由收集者主导的是CLSC更好的渠道结构。当奖励惩罚强度和CLSC领导者的责任率都很高时，社会福利就会增加。政府的RPM应该满足两个条件：（i）在高奖惩力度下，应该给CLSC领导者更多的责任； （ii）如果CLSC是由收藏家主导的，则她的责任率必须高于1/3，以提高收藏率。同样，在制造商主导的情况下，责任比例必须大于2/3，以提高回收率。 （C）2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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