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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Production Research >Joint advertising of complementary products sold through an independent retailer
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Joint advertising of complementary products sold through an independent retailer

机译：通过独立零售商共同销售补充产品的联合广告

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摘要

Two game-theoretic models are developed to study the profitability of joint advertising in a context where two manufacturers sell complementary products through an independent retailer and can either advertise separately or jointly. We find that it may not be in the interest of symmetric manufacturers to partner for advertising, especially when joint advertising is less effective than firms' individual advertising and the degree of advertising complementarity between the two products is high. Conversely, the manufacturers prefer joint advertising to individual advertising programs even if its effectiveness is lower, but both the degrees of price and advertising complementarity are very large. Under these conditions, joint advertising is implemented at the expense of the retailer who suffers from the associated reduced demand for the two products. In such a context, the manufacturers' advertising partnership mainly reduces advertising costs by mitigating double marginalisation in pricing. The extension to asymmetric manufacturers shows that the weaker manufacturer and the retailer can induce the stronger manufacturer to engage in joint advertising.
机译：在两个制造商通过独立零售商出售互补产品并且可以分别做广告或联合做广告的情况下，开发了两个博弈论模型来研究联合广告的盈利能力。我们发现，对称广告制造商与广告合作伙伴不符合利益，特别是当联合广告的效果不及公司的个人广告，并且两种产品之间的广告互补性很高时。相反，即使联合广告的效果较低，但它们仍倾向于联合广告，而不是单个广告程序，但是价格和广告互补性都很大。在这种情况下，联合广告的实施要以牺牲零售商的利益为代价，因为零售商对这两种产品的需求减少了。在这种情况下，制造商的广告合作伙伴关系主要是通过减轻价格的双重边缘化来降低广告成本。对不对称制造商的扩展表明，实力较弱的制造商和零售商可以诱使实力较强的制造商参与联合广告。

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