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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Production Research >Pricing decisions for three-echelon supply chain with advertising and quality effort-dependent fuzzy demand
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Pricing decisions for three-echelon supply chain with advertising and quality effort-dependent fuzzy demand

机译：具有广告和质量依赖型模糊需求的三级供应链的定价决策

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摘要

Simultaneous influence of market power structure, advertising and quality efforts on the optimal pricing decisions and performance of a multi-echelon supply chain under uncertainty have received scant attention in the literature. We focus on this gap by examining a serial decentralised three-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. The uncertainty associated with customer demand, marginal production costs and effort costs is expressed as linguistic or fuzzy variables. We analyse centralised supply chain to obtain all benchmark parameters. We investigate four decentralised supply chain cases through fuzzy game theoretic approach. We compare among three Stackelberg games with various supply chain leaderships and a vertical Nash. Our key findings are as follows. First, the manufacturer puts least quality effort while retailer puts least advertising effort when they act as Stackelberg leader in a three-echelon supply chain. Second, supplier's per unit price is governed by the channel leadership in three-echelon supply chain while retail prices are less affected by the leadership. We investigate the impact of fuzzy degree of quality and advertising sensitivity on optimal profit distribution among agents. We present numerical analysis to illustrate the importance of the derived theoretical results and discuss additional managerial insights.
机译：在不确定性下，市场力量结构，广告和质量努力对最优定价决策和多级供应链绩效的同时影响很少受到关注。通过研究由供应商，制造商和零售商组成的一系列分散的三级供应链，我们专注于这一差距。与客户需求，边际生产成本和人工成本相关的不确定性表示为语言或模糊变量。我们分析集中式供应链以获得所有基准参数。我们通过模糊博弈论方法研究了四个分散的供应链案例。我们在三个Stackelberg游戏中进行比较，这些游戏具有不同的供应链领导者和垂直Nash。我们的主要发现如下。首先，当制造商在三级供应链中担任Stackelberg领导者时，制造商投入的质量最少，而零售商则投入的广告最少。其次，供应商的单价受三级供应链中渠道领导者的支配，而零售价格受领导者的影响较小。我们调查质量模糊程度和广告敏感性对代理商之间最佳利润分配的影响。我们提供数值分析来说明得出的理论结果的重要性，并讨论其他管理方面的见识。

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