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Sharing quality information in a dual-supplier network:a game theoretic perspective

机译：在双供应商网络中共享质量信息：博弈论的观点

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摘要

We study a two-level supply chain consisting of two competing suppliers and one buyer. Both suppliers experience some level of uncertainty on product quality, which, in turn, leads to additional cost on the buyer's side. We evaluate the benefits of sharing information on suppliers' product quality with the buyer. Specifically, if a supplier shares its quality inspection result of sampled products on an order basis, how should the buyer use this information to reduce quality uncertainty in the products he received? Will quality information sharing benefit the supplier(s) as well? We develop an analytical model to investigate each member's performance with/without quality information sharing. We also develop equilibrium strategies for the suppliers with quality information sharing. Our results show that the buyer always benefits from quality information sharing. From the supplier's perspective, sharing quality information with the buyer impacts its market share. Moreover, whether to share its quality information depends on the supplier's product quality level and price level.
机译：我们研究了由两个相互竞争的供应商和一个买方组成的两级供应链。两家供应商在产品质量上都存在一定程度的不确定性，从而导致买方方面的额外成本。我们评估与买方共享有关供应商产品质量信息的好处。具体来说，如果供应商按订单共享其抽样产品的质量检验结果，那么买方应如何使用此信息来减少所收到产品的质量不确定性？质量信息共享是否也会使供应商受益？我们开发了一个分析模型来调查每个成员在有/没有质量信息共享时的表现。我们还为具有质量信息共享的供应商制定平衡策略。我们的结果表明，买方始终可以从质量信息共享中受益。从供应商的角度来看，与买方共享质量信息会影响其市场份额。此外，是否共享其质量信息取决于供应商的产品质量水平和价格水平。

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