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Antecedents of agency problems in service outsourcing

机译：服务外包代理问题的前提

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As outsourcing of services has grown in popularity, agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard have become more prevalent, leading to increased contracting costs. In this paper, we focus on how adverse selection and performance ambiguity arise in service outsourcing arrangements. We used agency theory as a theoretical lens to propose a mediated model where two antecedents, information asymmetry and goals compatibility, directly affect performance ambiguity, and indirectly through adverse selection. This model was tested empirically with dyadic data on 50 matched pair service outsourcing arrangements between organisations in Australia. Results show that information asymmetry impacts performance ambiguity through adverse selection, whereas goals compatibility affects performance ambiguity directly, without influencing adverse selection. These results suggest that the two agency problems are differentially affected by the antecedents of service outsourcing. The theoretical and practical contributions of this study are a better understanding of how different agency problems arise and how they can be controlled in service outsourcing in particular and in service production context more generally.
机译：由于服务外包的流行程度增长，逆向选择和道德风险等机构问题变得更加普遍，导致承包成本增加。在本文中，我们专注于服务外包安排中的选择和性能歧义如何。我们使用代理理论作为理论镜头，提出一个介导的模型，其中两个先发分子，信息不对称和目标兼容，直接影响性能歧义，间接通过不利选择。该模型经验与Dyadic数据进行了测试，根据澳大利亚组织的50个匹配对服务外包安排进行测试。结果表明，信息不对称通过不利选择影响性能模糊性，而目标兼容性直接影响性能模糊性，而不会影响不利选择。这些结果表明，这两个机构问题受到服务外包的前书的差异影响。本研究的理论和实践贡献更好地了解如何产生不同的代理问题以及如何更普遍地在服务外包中控制他们的服务外包。

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