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Moral hazard problem and collaborative coordination in supply chain with capacity reservation contract

机译：具有产能预订合同供应链中的道德危害问题与协作协调

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This paper has considered collaborative coordination in supply chains with capacity reservation contracts using the game theory. In some traditional papers, the capacity reservation contracts have contained a capacity quantity, a reservation quantity and a reservation fee as a decision variable. Each decision variable is determined separately based on individual profit functions of a supplier and a manufacturer under the noncooperative game theory. Those papers have assumed that the supplier is always forced to build sufficient capacity to cover the reservation amount of the manufacturer. However, the supplier might not always comply with the reservation amount of the manufacturer since the capacity quantity is a private decision in the supplier and not released to external companies in practice. For instance, the supplier may choose to under-build knowingly to ensure high utilisation of his capacity. This is a kind of moral hazard problems. This paper has investigated such a strategy that the supplier and manufacturer voluntarily comply with the contract for the purpose of solving the moral hazard problem in the capacity reservation contract. Consequently, we have proposed a method of determining the decision variables collaboratively in the contract such that a consensus of the supplier and manufacturer is built.
机译：本文认为，使用博弈论具有能力预订合同的供应链中的协作协调。在一些传统论文中，能力预订合同载有能力量，预订数量和预订费用作为决策变量。每个决策变量是基于在非自由作博弈论下的供应商的个体利润功能和制造商的各个统治变量。这些文件假设供应商总是被迫建立足够的能力来支付制造商的预订金额。但是，由于产能数量是供应商的私人决定，供应商可能并不总是遵守制造商的预订金额，而不是在实践中发布到外部公司。例如，供应商可以故意选择以确保高利用他的能力。这是一种道德风险问题。本文调查了供应商和制造商自愿遵守合同的策略，以解决能力预订合同中的道德危害问题。因此，我们提出了一种在合同中协同协作确定决策变量的方法，使得供应商和制造商的共识。

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