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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Production Research >Supply chain investment and de-escalation of capacity competition
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Supply chain investment and de-escalation of capacity competition

机译：供应链投资和脱升力竞争

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摘要

Research on capacity competition has examined the conditions under which early mover's capacity investment might preempt, or instead escalate, latecomers' capacity investment. In contrast, this paper investigates the role of early mover's supply chain investment in de-escalating subsequent capacity competition, in a setting where competing firms enter a new location to establish new production sites. Supply chain investment refers to investment in developing and integrating with supply chain partners in the location where a production site resides. We build a two-stage model where an early mover and a latecomer first make their investment decisions sequentially, and next choose either their output level (Cournot competition) or pricing (Bertrand competition) simultaneously. Predictions derived from the analytical model is then tested using data on a set of leading IT manufacturers. Both analytical and empirical results suggest that latecomer's capacity investment increases correspondingly with early mover's capacity investment, but decreases with early mover's supply chain investment.
机译：能力竞争研究已经审查了早期搬家能力的能力投资可能抢占或升级的条件，或者升级后，拉森德能力投资。相比之下，本文调查了早期搬运工的供应链投资在竞争公司在建立新的生产网站的新位置的环境中取消了随后的随后能力竞争的作用。供应链投资是指在生产现场所在地区的供应链合作伙伴开发和整合的投资。我们建立了一个两阶段模型，早期移动者和拉伸者首先将其投资决策顺序进行，然后再次选择其产出水平（Cournot竞争）或同时定价（Bertrand竞争）。然后使用关于一组领先的IT制造商的数据测试从分析模型的预测。分析和经验结果均表明，拉森伯的能力投资相应地增加了早期搬家的能力投资，但随着早期搬家供应链投资而减少。

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