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Relationship between governance mechanisms and contract performance

机译：治理机制与合同绩效的关系

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摘要

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explain the variation in the relationship between governance mechanisms and the effect of the relationship on contract performance, especially in controlling partner opportunism. Design/methodology/approach - This study conducts a comparative case analysis of contract governance of "National Health Insurance Program" in India. The data are collected using field research through in-depth interviews and direct observation across three states in India. Findings - The authors find that the governance mechanisms continue to complement and substitute, both in a dynamic manner, but until aligned with the nature of transaction, they are ineffective to mitigate opportunism, a critical dimension of contract performance. Inappropriate governance mechanisms inflate the gaps in incomplete contracts, resulting in partner opportunism. Research limitations/implications - The study draws findings from healthcare context and service-based contracting; therefore, the applicability of this study may vary in other contexts. Practical implications - The paper highlights the need for building flexibility in the governance structure while designing contracts. Further, managers need to combine both governance mechanisms dynamically to align with the nature of the transaction to control partner opportunism. Originality/value - The authors contribute to the existing debate on the conundrum of the relationship between governance mechanisms and provide a new explanation. The authors propose that it is not the specific governance mechanisms but the alignment of the governance mix with the nature of the transaction that determines the contract performance, especially control of partner opportunism.
机译：目的 - 本文的目的是解释治理机制之间关系的变化以及对合同绩效关系的影响，尤其是控制伴侣机会主义。设计/方法/方法 - 本研究对印度“全国健康保险计划”进行了比较案例分析。通过在印度三个州的深入访谈和直接观察，使用现场研究收集数据。调查结果 - 作者发现治理机制继续以动态方式补充和替代，但直到与交易的性质对齐，他们无效地减轻机会主义，合同表现的关键方面。不适当的治理机制在不完整的合同中充气，导致合作机会主义。研究限制/含义 - 研究从医疗保健环境和基于服务的合同中汲取了结果;因此，本研究的适用性可能在其他环境中变化。实际意义 - 该文件突出了在设计合同时在治理结构中构建灵活性的需求。此外，管理人员需要动态地将治理机制组合，以与交易的性质对齐，以控制合作伙伴机会主义。原创性/价值 - 作者有助于对治理机制之间关系的现有争论，并提供新的解释。作者提出，这不是特定的治理机制，而是治理组合与决定合同绩效的交易的性质，特别是对合作伙伴机会主义的交易的性质。

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