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首页> 外文期刊>International Relations of the Asia-Pacific >Is there an aid-for-participation deal?: US economic and military aid policy to coalition forces (non)participants
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Is there an aid-for-participation deal?: US economic and military aid policy to coalition forces (non)participants

机译：有参与援助协议吗？：美国对联军（非）参与者的经济和军事援助政策

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There is an empirical evidence of an aid-for-policy deal between the United States and other states; the United States has utilized aid programs to promote affirmative votes in the UN General Assembly and to maintain an alliance relationship with strategically important states. However, whether there is a systematic evidence of an aid-for-participation deal remains inconclusive. Does the United States generally utilize its foreign aid to reward the contribution of troops to the US-led multinational forces and to punish the lack of contribution? The author argues that US foreign aid is used to prevent free-riding in coalition participation. To test the argument, I examined whether states were punished or rewarded by the United States for their behavior in sending or failing to send troops to 15 post-Second World War US-led coalition forces. The results show that the United States punished states for unexpected nonparticipation, but did not always provide rewards for support.
机译：有经验证据表明美国与其他州之间达成了一项政策援助协议；美国利用援助计划在联合国大会上促进赞成票，并与具有战略意义的国家保持联盟关系。但是，是否有系统的证据表明参与援助协议尚无定论。美国是否一般利用其外国援助来奖励部队对以美国为首的多国部队的贡献并惩罚缺乏贡献的国家？作者认为，美国的外国援助被用来防止联盟搭便车。为了检验这一论点，我研究了各州是否因其在第二次世界大战后由美国领导的15个联军派遣或不派遣部队方面的行为而受到了惩罚或奖励。结果表明，美国因意外的不参加而对各州进行了惩罚，但并不总是提供支持的奖励。

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