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Endogenous choice of strategic incentives in a mixed duopoly with a new managerial delegation contract for the public firm

机译：混合双头垄断中的战略激励的内生选择，以及针对公共公司的新管理授权合同

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摘要

This paper revisits the endogenous choice problem of the strategic contracts in a mixed duopoly of one public firm and one managerial private firm, with differentiated goods. This paper considers the situation wherein the separation between ownership and management exists in both the public firm and the private firm. In particular, we focus on a new type of managerial delegation contract in the public firm that is a weighted sum of social welfare and the difference between consumer surplus and producer surplus (sum of each firm's absolute profit). On the other hand, in this paper, the classical sales delegation contract is employed in the private firm. In the above setting, we show that similar to the case wherein both the public firm and the private firm simultaneously use their sales delegation contracts, there does not exist any equilibrium market structure under the class of pure strategies of both the firms. Thus, even if the government as the owner of the public firm provides to her/his manager a strategic delegation contract such that it is easier to manipulate social welfare, we find that it is likely that the indeterminacy in the equilibrium market structure(s) under the class of pure strategies cannot be resolved. Therefore, in this paper, we conclude that the government must devise another style of managerial delegation contract of the public firm in order to assure the equilibrium market structure under the pure strategy class.
机译：本文探讨了在具有差异商品的一个公立公司和一个管理私有公司的混合双头垄断中战略合同的内生选择问题。本文考虑了公有企业和私有企业中所有权和管理权之间存在分离的情况。特别是，我们关注于一种新型的管理型委托合同，该合同是社会福利的加权总和以及消费者剩余与生产者剩余之间的差额（每个企业的绝对利润之和）。另一方面，在本文中，古典销售委托合同是在私人公司中使用的。在上述情况下，我们表明，与公营公司和私营公司同时使用其销售委托合同的情况类似，在两家公司的纯策略类别下，不存在任何均衡的市场结构。因此，即使作为上市公司所有者的政府向其经理提供了战略授权合同，从而更容易操纵社会福利，我们也发现均衡市场结构中的不确定性很可能纯粹战略下的阶级是无法解决的。因此，在本文中，我们得出结论，政府必须设计另一种类型的上市公司管理委托合同，以确保在纯战略类别下的均衡市场结构。

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