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首页> 外文期刊>International review of economics >Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?
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Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

机译：持有和外部性：公司是不完整权利的纽带吗？

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摘要

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386—405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to 'make' versus 'buy'. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1^4, 1960). As firm's activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting 'Coasean firm' would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.
机译：企业的库斯理论（Coase in Economica 4：386-405，1937年）随着不完全合同理论的发展而繁荣。执法成本形式的交易成本已被视为决定“制造”与“购买”的主要决定因素。令人惊讶的是，这一文献流几乎忽略了交易成本也可能产生不完整的财产权（Coase in J Law Econ 3：1 ^ 4，1960）。由于公司的活动既涉及合同权利又涉及财产权，所以这两个领域在决定在公司内部进行交易时会相互干扰。当产权不完整时，潜在的外部性可能会增加使用价格机制购买给定交易所需资产的成本。由此产生的“科萨斯公司”不仅将不完整的合同集中在统一的治理体系下，而且还将不完整的产权汇总在统一的所有权结构下。

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