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On the optimal lifetime redistribution and social objectives: a multidimensional approach

机译:关于最佳终身再分配和社会目标:多维方法

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We characterize optimal redistribution policy when there are differences not only in individuals' productivities but also in their tastes towards the timing of consumption, i.e. some are patient and others impatient in consumption over the life cycle and this preference together with productivity is non-observable to government. We consider different social objectives and incorporate a novel approach taken in the spirit of Roemer (Equality of opportunity, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1998) and Van de Gaer (Equality of opportunity and investments in human capital, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1993). This approach applies a compromise between the principle of compensation and the principle of responsibility. We derive analytical expressions which describe the optimal distortion (upward or downward) in saving. As the multidimensional problems become very complicated, to gain a better understanding, we also numerically examine the properties of an optimal lifetime redistribution policy. We find support for a nonlinear tax/pension program in which impatient types are taxed at the margin, and patient low ability types are subsidized in their retirement consumption. Numerical simulations show quite big differences in terms of the levels of marginal tax rates between different social objectives, indicating that the optimal income taxation results are sensitive to the choice of the social planner's goals.
机译:当不仅个人生产力而且在消费时机上他们的品位存在差异时,即某些人在整个生命周期内对病人有耐心而对消费不耐烦,并且这种偏好与生产率是不可观察到的时,我们就表征了最佳的再分配政策。政府。我们考虑了不同的社会目标,并结合了Roemer(机会平等,哈佛大学出版社,哈佛,1998)和Van de Gaer(机会均等和人力资本投资,凯瑟琳克·鲁汶大学,1993)的精神所采用的新颖方法。这种方法在补偿原则和责任原则之间进行了折衷。我们导出分析表达式,这些表达式描述了储蓄中的最佳失真(向上或向下)。随着多维问题变得非常复杂,为了获得更好的理解,我们还从数字上研究了最佳寿命重新分配策略的属性。我们发现了对非线性税收/养老金计划的支持,在该计划中,不耐烦的人种在边际上征税,而低能力的人种在他们的退休消费中得到补贴。数值模拟表明,不同社会目标之间的边际税率水平差异很大,这表明最佳所得税结果对社会计划者目标的选择敏感。

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