...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>International tax and public finance >The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data
【24h】

The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data

机译：集聚对税收竞争的影响：来自法国数据的两区域空间面板模型的证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This article studies how agglomeration economies affect tax competition between local jurisdictions. We develop a theoretical model with two main testable predictions: in a setting where agglomeration forces lessen the responsiveness of capital to tax, high-regime agglomeration jurisdictions should adopt a rent-taxing behavior, and they should react less to their neighbors' tax policies. The panel dataset spans the period from 1995 to 2007 and focuses on the local business taxes set at the French mid-subnational jurisdiction level of d,partements. First, instrumental variables estimates indicate that attractive jurisdictions capture a significant part of firms' agglomeration rent by levying higher tax rates. An increase by 1% of the localization economies indicator (a specialization index) leads to increasing the business tax rate by 0.43%. Second, local tax setting behaviors are characterized by a mimetic behavior, with best response functions that slope upwards. We propose a two-agglomeration-regime spatial lag model to estimate through ML the relationship between tax competition and attractiveness. Our main result shows that both are linked and tax mimicry is less pronounced if a jurisdiction is agglomerated. Specifically, in response to a decrease in the tax rate of neighboring local governments by 1%, local governments with strong agglomeration economies reduce their tax rate by 0.4% against 0.6% for local government characterized by a low-agglomeration regime. We show that the classical one-size-fits-all-case of a single regime of agglomeration suffers from a 40% downward bias for low-agglomeration jurisdictions. We draw the link to policy praxis by discussing the optimal design of equalization schemes.
机译：本文研究集聚经济如何影响地方管辖区之间的税收竞争。我们建立了一个具有两个主要可验证预测的理论模型：在集聚力量降低资本对税收反应性的情况下，高制度集聚管辖区应采取租金征税行为，而对邻国的税收政策应采取较少的反应。面板数据集跨度从1995年到2007年，着重于在法国中级以下国家（地区）司法管辖区级设置的地方营业税。首先，工具变量估计值表明，有吸引力的司法管辖区通过征收更高的税率来获取企业集聚租金的很大一部分。本地化经济指标（专业化指数）提高1％，营业税率提高0.43％。第二，地方税收设定行为的特征是模仿行为，其最佳响应函数会向上倾斜。我们提出了两个集聚区域的空间滞后模型，以通过ML估计税收竞争与吸引力之间的关系。我们的主要结果表明，如果将一个司法管辖区聚集起来，两者的联系和税收模仿将不太明显。具体而言，为应对邻近地方政府的税率降低1％的趋势，集聚经济强的地方政府将其税率降低0.4％，而对于以低集聚体制为特征的地方政府而言，税率则为0.6％。我们表明，对于低集聚辖区而言，单一集聚体制的经典“一刀切”情况下的偏见下降了40％。通过讨论均衡方案的最佳设计，我们得出了与政策实践的联系。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号