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首页> 外文期刊>Internet of Things Journal, IEEE >A Contract-Based Insurance Incentive Mechanism Boosted by Wearable Technology
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A Contract-Based Insurance Incentive Mechanism Boosted by Wearable Technology

机译：一种基于合同的保险机制，可穿戴技术促进

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摘要

Traditional health insurance schemes make contracts with periodic premiums according to the health conditions of customers. Insurance companies are thus seeking an incentive for a healthy lifestyle of customers. Nowadays, more and more people want to gather metrics associated with physical activity. High quality and quantity information introduced by wearable devices may indicate the potential risks of acute conditions. Therefore, wearable technology brings new opportunities for insurance companies to change the interaction way with customers and to improve risk management for users. In this article, we investigate the problem of incentive mechanism design for the insurance market boosted by wearable technology. Designing an effective incentive mechanism is challenging since both the insurer and the users are selfish and rational parties who try to maximize their own utility. There exists an information asymmetry, i.e., the insurer is unaware of the intrinsic physical fitness of each user (type of users). Inspired by the contract theory, we design a series of optimal insurance contracts with different premium discounts and recommended exercise levels targeting different types of users. We first analyze the scenario where the insurer knows the type of each individual, then move to the more practical case where the insurer has incomplete information of user types. We theoretically prove that the proposed contracts satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility, which enables the insurer to achieve utility maximization and each type of user to choose the most appropriate contract. We have conducted extensive simulations to provide insight into the performance under different scenarios. The numerical results verify that our contract-based insurance incentive mechanism maximizes insurer's utility and motivates users to exercise more.
机译：传统的健康保险计划根据客户的健康状况与定期保费进行合同。因此，保险公司正在寻求奖励客户的健康生活方式。如今，越来越多的人希望收集与身体活动相关的指标。可穿戴设备引入的高质量和数量信息可能表示急性条件的潜在风险。因此，可穿戴技术为保险公司带来了新的机会，以改变与客户的互动方式，并改善用户的风险管理。在本文中，我们调查了可穿戴技术促进了保险市场的激励机制设计问题。设计有效的激励机制是挑战，因为保险公司和用户都是自私和理性的派对，他们试图最大限度地提高自己的效用。存在信息不对称，即，保险公司不知道每个用户的内在身体健康（用户类型）。灵感来自合同理论，我们设计了一系列具有不同优质折扣的最佳保险合同，并针对不同类型用户的推荐运动水平。我们首先分析保险公司知道每个人的类型的场景，然后转移到保险公司具有不完整的用户类型信息的更实际的情况。理论上，我们证明拟议的合同满足个人合理性和激励兼容性，这使得保险公司能够实现实用的最大化和每种类型的用户来选择最合适的合同。我们已经进行了广泛的模拟，以便在不同场景下的性能中深入了解。数值结果验证了我们的合同保险机制最大化保险公司的效用，并激励用户锻炼更多。

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